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A Psychological Account of Consent to
Fine Print
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
ABSTRACT: The moral and social norms that bear on contracts of
adhesion suggest a deep ambivalence. Contracts are perceived as serious
moral obligations, and yet they must be taken lightly or everyday commerce
would be impossible. Most people see consent to boilerplate as less
meaningful than consent to negotiated terms, but they nonetheless would
hold consumers strictly liable for both. This Essay aims to unpack the beliefs,
preferences, assumptions, and biases that constitute our assessments of
assent to boilerplate. Research suggests that misgivings about procedural
defects in consumer contracting weigh heavily on judgments of contract
formation, but play almost no role in judgments of blame for transactional
harms. Using experimental methods from the psychology of judgment and
decision-making, I test the psychological explanations for this disjunction,
including motivated reasoning and reliance on availability heuristics.
Many commentators have argued that even though it is true that disclosures
are probably ineffective, they “can’t hurt.” I conclude with a challenge to
that proposition—I argue that the can’t-hurt attitude may lead to overuse of
disclosures that do not affect consumer decision-making, but have implicit
effects on the moral calculus of transactional harms.
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very grateful for David Hoffman’s comments on an earlier draft, and for feedback from
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and Economics seminar. This Essay benefitted greatly from the able research assistance of
Liann Sun, Bonnie White, and Ryan Wolf.
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INTRODUCTION
The proposition that most people do not read the small print, heed the
warning labels, or review the “Terms and Conditions” links, is no longer
controversial. Nonetheless, the barrage of fine-print disclosures continues
unabated, and enforcement of universally unread terms is assumed. The
juxtaposition of these facts of modern contracting—widespread reliance on
disclosures to protect consumers and widespread agreement that disclosures
do not affect consumer behavior—is somewhat puzzling. Contracts scholars
have largely approached this puzzle in normative terms, attempting to
reconcile the idea of meaningful assent with the core contract doctrine of
implied consent to unread terms. What scholars have overlooked in this
discussion is a coherent descriptive theory of modern contracting. How do
ordinary consumers understand their contractual obligations when
formation of most contracts is perfunctory, but the moral and legal rhetoric
of contract enforcement is robust? A psychological account of consumer
consent sheds new light on the costs and benefits of fine-print contracting.
Consent to standard terms occupies an uneasy place in the existing
research on the moral psychology of contracts. The relevant moral and
social norms that bear on contracts of adhesion evince a deep cultural
ambivalence. Contracts are understood to be serious moral obligations, and
yet everyday commercial activity requires that consumers sign agreements
that contain terms they have not read. Most people see consent to
boilerplate as less meaningful than consent to negotiated terms, but
nonetheless would hold consumers strictly liable for both. This is an area
with unclear—if not bipolar—norms, and we do not know how individuals
assimilate conflicting preferences and bodies of evidence into judgments of
consumer consent.
At a broad level, this Essay attempts to tease out the beliefs, preferences,
assumptions, and biases that constitute our assessments of assent to
boilerplate. To do this, I use methods from the psychology of judgment and
decision-making. This Essay presents five short vignette studies about
transacting by boilerplate in an effort to examine how consumers think
about modern contracting, and how the context of modern contracting
bears on judgments of transactional harms. I argue that most people are
sensitive to the realities of contracting via boilerplate, and are concerned
that consent to fine print is compromised consent. Nonetheless, the
vignettes suggest, when it comes to explaining transactional harms,1 blaming
the consumer who consented to the agreement for the harm is both
psychologically attractive as well as cognitively available. Even in the face of

1. In this Essay, I will use the phrase “transactional harm” to refer loosely to a broad class
of unfavorable results in consumer transactions, principally those that result from enforcement
of unfavorable terms.
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evidence of procedural defects or wrongdoing by the drafter, participants’
instincts were to hold the consumer to the boilerplate terms.
My argument unfolds in two steps, focusing first on assent and then on
enforcement. The first proposition is that the social practice of consumer
contracting invokes powerful but conflicting norms and intuitions. Most
people have strong feelings about individual autonomy in the marketplace,
coupled with concerns about both the effectiveness of fine-print disclosures
and the potential for drafters’ strategic behavior to go unchecked. When
asked to think about contract formation, the participants in the studies
reported in this Essay recognized that readership of some terms is an
unrealistic expectation, and expressed doubts that consent to boilerplate is
meaningful. In other words, when people are asked to think about how we
make contracts in the modern world, they show real ambivalence about
consent to boilerplate.
The puzzle is that this ambivalence seems to dissipate entirely when
questions about consent come up in the context of contract enforcement.
Once the framing is about how to understand a transactional harm—the
enforcement of an unfavorable term—the subjects in these studies agreed
that a non-reading consumer has clearly consented to be bound and ought
to bear the blame for the bad outcome, no matter how cumbersome the
demands of readership. Thus, the second step of my argument is that when
confronted with the task of explaining a harmful event, there is a shift in
motivation and in cognition. The motivation to assign blame (and to assign
blame in a psychologically comfortable way) increases, and some causal
explanations of the harm grow more salient than others, drawing attention
to the consumer’s consent and away from other contributing factors. These
studies suggest that we understand consent one way in the context of
contract formation, and another in the context of enforcement.
The unread fine print has been at the center of a number of recent
national debates, including subprime mortgage lending,2 hurricane
insurance,3 universal default clauses in credit-card contracts,4 and hidden

2. Aaron Smith, Note, A Suitability Standard for Mortgage Brokers: Developing a Common Law
Theory, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 377, 389 (2010) (“Unlike other business transactions
where the customers understand what they are buying and what the alternatives are, mortgage
customers are unlikely to comprehend the fine print that is so critical in modern mortgages.”).
3. Jay S. Goldbaum, Comment, Katrina and Beyond: Judicial Treatment of Boilerplate
Language in Standardized Insurance Contracts, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 453, 45455 (discussing
insurance litigation in Mississippi following Hurricane Katrina which turned on boilerplate
“flood exclusion” language).
4. Mary Beth Matthews, The Credit CARD Act of 2009—What Is It, and What Does It Do?,
2010 ARK. L. NOTES 65, 68 (including universal default provisions among credit card practices
targeted by the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009).
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fees in banking contracts.5 These debates raise questions of consumer
responsibility, the duties of institutional parties drafting take-it-or-leave-it
forms, and the background realities of consumer contracting in the modern
world. Behavioral researchers have argued for decades that it is utterly
unrealistic to think that consumers can read and process fine-print
disclosures.6 Not only are form contracts unread, they are functionally
unreadable (or at least indigestible) for consumers with bounded cognitive
capacity—i.e., everyone. The now well-trodden biases that result from
limited attentional resources have straightforward implications in the
boilerplate context. Distorted risk perceptions, salience biases, and framing
effects make it very unlikely that consumers will read the terms of form
contracts—and even if they do read the terms, it is unlikely that they will
integrate the information into their decision-making process in a sensible
way.7
Nevertheless, the legal response to this evidence from behavioral
economics has been somewhat dismissive. Modern contracts scholarship
evinces a shared sense that the primary function of fine-print disclosure is
not consumer information at all, but rather justification of a crucial legal
fiction. A robust doctrine of implied consent to unread or unnoticed terms
is central to the laws governing millions of transactions a day, including
consumer contracting, product liability, informed consent to medical care,
real property transfers, advertising, and financial planning. Because real
readership is understood to be a lost cause, most scholarly support of
mandatory disclosure policies stipulates that disclosures are unhelpful to
consumers, and the scholars justify enforcement of unread terms on

5. Cindy Perman, Gotcha! Ways Banks Burn You with Hidden Fees, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2011,
3:39
PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/41604971/Gotcha_Ways_Banks_Burn_You_With_
Hidden_Fees (detailing different forms of banking fees that catch consumers by surprise).
6. See, e.g., Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory
Disclaimers in Advertising, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 293, 293 (2012) (examining eighteen
experimental studies and concluding that there is “no evidence that consumers benefit from
government-mandated disclaimers in advertising”); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract
Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 96 (2012) (“[I]ncreasing
contract accessibility does not result in a meaningful increase in readership. . . . [T]hose (few)
shoppers who actually read the contract do not respond to what they see there.”).
7. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 240–43 (1995) (asserting that cognitive problems such as “bounded rationality,
optimistic disposition, systematic underestimation of risks,” undue weight on the present as
compared with the future, and rational ignorance cause consumers “to remain ignorant of the
preprinted terms” of a form contract).
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normative grounds, with reference to constructs like opportunity to read,8
blanket assent,9 or rational ignorance.10
This Essay demonstrates that psychology research has a role to play in
the mandatory-disclosure debate that extends beyond documenting
cognitive errors. The experimental studies reported below explore how
consumers themselves understand consent to fine print—the psychology of
judgment rather than the psychology of decision-making. This analysis tries
to explore this question systematically, unpacking the psychological
processes that bear on a commonsense morality of informed consent. I
argue that the moral psychology of consumer contracting beliefs can be
understood as bearing on two sets of judgments: (1) ex ante assessments of
contract formation; and (2) ex post assessments of consumer liability when a
warned-of harm comes to pass. Misgivings about procedural defects in
consumer contracting weigh heavily on judgments of contract formation,
but appear to play almost no role in judgments of blame for transactional
harms.
The Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I set up the problem with
descriptive, legal, and theoretical perspectives on consent to fine print in
consumer contracting. Part II lays out evidence, from existing and new
research, that consumer contracting invokes conflicting norms. Study 1 in
this Part tests the relationship between contract procedures and inferences
of consent, and the results show evidence that subjects may believe that it is
unreasonable to expect consumers to read terms in some forms, but that
they would nonetheless hold those non-reading consumers accountable for
transactional harms that occur ex post. Parts III and IV make the case that
there are psychological explanations—involving a particular set of
motivations, intuitions, and cognitive processes—for these differential
evaluations of consent at the formation and enforcement stages of
contracting. In Part III, I present Studies 2 and 3, offering evidence that the
mere fact of consumer harm motivates inferences of consumer consent to
8. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 734 (2011) (describing the argument that mandatory disclosures promote the
values of “autonomy, dignity, civility, community, citizenship, [and] economic growth” by
presenting consumers with an opportunity to read).
9. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960)
(“Instead of thinking about ‘assent’ to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far as
concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically,
are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more.
That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or
indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
meaning of the dickered terms.”).
10. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 3, 8 (Omri BenShahar ed., 2007) (“The novelty of the present analysis is that the same contract forms that are
widely assumed to be based on consumer ignorance can be shown to be consistent with
competition under conditions of full information.”).
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that harm. Part IV includes Studies 4 and 5, which show that consumer
decision-making is a highly salient link in the chain of causation that
explains a transactional harm. Part V concludes with a discussion of these
findings in light of procedural justice research, and I argue that the next
step in the moral psychology of contracting is the development of a robust
body of research on procedural justice in the consumer marketplace.
I.

MODERN CONSUMER CONTRACTING

A. BOILERPLATE IS UBIQUITOUS AND UNREAD
Most user agreements, terms of credit, informed-consent forms, and
product warranties (to name a few) are long and difficult to understand.11
Furthermore, most disclosures arise in an already crowded field of
boilerplate. As such, most people have no choice but to perform a kind of
triage on their reading priorities due to the overwhelming volume of
information that disclosees face in a given day. To make this point, I rely
heavily on the definitive account of disclosure overload by Omri Ben-Shahar
and Carl Schneider.12 In addition to their meticulous chronicling of the
omnipresent fine print of modern life, they give a witty yet all-too-real
account of a day in the world of “Chris Consumer.” Chris confronts detailed
terms and conditions for his vitamins, his toaster, his car mechanic, an
online news service, a web browser, his bank, a diner menu, a flu shot, and
Monday Night Football, among others.13 Disclosures, fine print, standard
terms—these are unavoidable facts of modern life.
Nonetheless—or perhaps, as a result—one of the truisms of empirical
contracts research is that “nobody reads.” This is particularly true of online
contracts, including end-user license agreements and click-through
agreements that retail sites use. One recent study documented the lack of
readership in painstaking detail.14 Out of 120,545 consumer visits to online

11. See Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 313–14 (7th Cir. 1981) (describing a
statute’s drafters’ concern that “consumer product warranties often were too complex to be
understood”); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 671–72 (citing evidence that
“readership is effectively zero”); Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al., Readability Standards for
Informed-Consent Forms as Compared with Actual Readability, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 721, 724 (2003)
(reporting that “only 8 percent [of medical schools] . . . met their own standards” for
readability of informed-consent forms); Chris Kaiser, Complex Drug Labels May Be Information
Overload, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 24, 2011), http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealth
Policy/FDAGeneral/26665 (“[T]he effectiveness of labeling in communicating adverse drug
events may be diminished by the problem of overwarning, in which excessively long and
complex lists of potential reactions can result in information overload . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
12. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 704–09.
13. Id. at 705–08.
14. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics
Approach to Standard Form Contracts (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No.
09-40, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256.
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retail sites, 55 of those users clicked through to see the terms and
conditions15—this is roughly one out of 2200 users. The users who did click
through spent a median of 29 seconds looking at the entire multi-page
agreement.16
Even when investigators choose more elite population samples, they still
find very low levels of readership. In a sample of University of Georgia
undergraduates, 89% of respondents classified themselves as “non-readers”
of click-through agreements.17 A survey of law students—a group essentially
hand-picked for its propensity to read legal documents—found that only
about 4% claim to read standard online form contracts.18 All available
evidence suggests that online form contracts are consistently unread.
Online forms are not the only contracts that consumers are ignoring.
Although there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on non-readership
outside of the online context, contracts scholars regard non-readership as
“folk knowledge”: a claim so obvious that data would be superfluous.19 In
one of the first empirical accounts of contracts behavior, Stewart Macaulay
reported that even businessmen did not read the contracts they regularly
signed in the course of their commercial interactions, preferring to rely on
their background sense of the deal and the counterparty.20 Courts and
scholars alike have noticed a similar pattern in the readership of form
contracts generally. As early as 1983, well before the advent of EULAs (enduser license agreements) and click-throughs, Todd Rakoff wrote:
[T]he adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the
standard terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have
understood them if he has read them. Virtually every scholar who
has written about contracts of adhesion has accepted the truth of
this assertion, and the few empirical studies that have been done
have agreed.21

15. Id. at 26.
16. Id.
17. Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett, III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological
Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 297 (2012).
18. Robert A. Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and
Discussion of Legal Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION
ECONOMY’ 283, 289 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
19. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 671 (“Empirical work is scant, perhaps
because of the folk knowledge that no one reads boilerplate.”).
20. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55, 59 (1963).
21. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173,
1179 (1983) (footnote omitted).

E2_WILKINSON-RYAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/2014 11:35 AM

2014] A PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF CONSENT TO FINE PRINT

1753

The reality is that reading is costly, especially in a world in which
everything comes with extensive standard terms.22 Meanwhile, the expected
benefit of any investment in reading standard terms is low for three reasons:
(1) the transaction itself is minor; (2) the probability of unfavorable terms is
low;23 and (3) the probability of a given consumer being affected by an
unfavorable term is low.24
The proposition that consumers do not read contracts of adhesion is
increasingly uncontroversial, cited by legal scholars to support claims that
consumers are rationally ignorant,25 that consumers are ignorant dupes,26
and that contracts of adhesion are inefficient in any case.27 It is now a given
that we live in a world in which boilerplate terms are ubiquitous yet
unknown, ever present and never read. In the next two Subparts, I consider
the relevant legal doctrines and the scholarly responses.
B. CONTRACT DOCTRINE: DUTY TO READ
The vast majority of terms no one reads are enforceable. As a matter of
black letter law, not knowing the terms of one’s contract does not excuse a
party from liability.28 This doctrine is often referred to as a party’s “duty to
read,”29 and it has been at the center of a number of recent national debates
around subprime mortgage lending,30 insurance coverage after Hurricane
Katrina,31 universal default clauses in credit card contracts,32 and hidden

22. Eric Posner has argued that the advantage of a decision like ProCD v. Zeidenberg, in
which Judge Easterbrook enforced terms that were not available to the consumer until after
purchase, is that consumers cannot, in practice, handle getting all the terms up front.
Commerce would grind to a halt while consumers wasted their time listening to the “droning
voice” of the sales staff reading the terms aloud. Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and
Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1183–84 (2010).
23. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers?
Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309 (2009).
24. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 243.
25. Id. at 241–43.
26. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power,
84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (“An unfair form will not deter sales because the seller can
easily arrange his sales so that few if any buyers will read his forms, whatever their terms, and he
risks nothing because the law will treat his forms as contracts anyway.”).
27. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 716–21 (1992) (rejecting economists’
assertions that contracts of adhesion are efficient).
28. See 27 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 70:113 (4th ed. 2003) (“A written contract speaks for itself and, absent fraud or
mistake, ignorance of contents will not allow one to avoid its contents.”).
29. Id.
30. Smith, supra note 2, at 389 (“Unlike other business transactions where the customers
understand what they are buying and what the alternatives are, mortgage customers are unlikely
to comprehend the fine print that is so critical in modern mortgages.”).
31. Goldbaum, supra note 3, at 454–55 (discussing insurance litigation in Mississippi
following Hurricane Katrina which turned on boilerplate “flood exclusion” language).
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fees in banking contracts.33 In some cases—universal default clauses, for
example—legislatures have stepped in to regulate terms perceived as
unfair.34
Under the common law, though, most of these problematic clauses are
relatively easy cases. Non-readership is no excuse, even when the facts are
sympathetic. For example, the Fifth Circuit held that insurance
policyholders denied compensation after Hurricane Katrina were bound to
the written terms even where the salesman had represented that the policy’s
coverage included the denied claims; the court ruled that, “The insured is
bound by [written] policy language that would put a reasonable person on
notice of limitations to the agent’s authority.”35 In another case, a party
subject to a forum-selection clause argued that the term should be
unenforceable because of the plaintiff’s poor eyesight; the Seventh Circuit
noted that “it is no defense to say, ‘I did not read what I was signing.’”36 In
still another case, mortgage borrowers who discovered that their agreement
contained an adjustable rate that they did not apprehend before signing
were held liable; the court reasoned “[t]hat the plaintiffs did not read any of
these documents does not place culpability on the defendant.”37 In sum,
whether or not a party has read the contract is usually irrelevant to the
determination of mutual assent.
What is required is that parties have some notice of the terms—an
“opportunity to read.”38 If a contract term is “hidden,” a court may refuse to
enforce it on the grounds that the parties did not manifest their assent.39 In
Specht v. Netscape, for example, then-Judge Sotomayor confirmed that a party
must have actual or constructive notice of a term in order for the term to be
enforceable.40 Parties are deemed to consent to terms they have reason to
know exist, but firms must give parties reason to know of the terms.41 In
32. Matthews, supra note 4, at 6871 (including universal default provisions among credit card
practices targeted by the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009).
33. See Perman, supra note 5 (detailing different forms of banking fees that catch
consumers by surprise).
34. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-24, § 101(b), 123 Stat. 1734, 1736.
35. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 439 (5th Cir. 2007).
36. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989).
37. Strong v. Option One Mortg. Corp. (In re Strong), 356 B.R. 121, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2004), aff’d, Nos. 01-35854BIF, 02-626, 04-CV-4699, 2005 WL 1463245 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2005).
38. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
an online contract provision was unenforceable because defendants “did not provide
reasonable notice of the license terms”).
39. Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for
U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10–12 (1981).
40. Specht, 306 F.3d at 35.
41. Even this is not always clear; Judge Easterbrook argued in Gateway that the parties had
to think more terms were coming, even if they did not have any explicit notice from the
company that that was so. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
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general, however, courts will enforce hidden terms as long as the party has
some means to exit the contract when the term is revealed, even if doing so
is burdensome and unlikely.42
Scholarly acknowledgment of non-readership has had periodic effects
on contract doctrine, although the effects have not always been long lasting.
The main effect has been the push to expand the requirement of notice to
include the content of the terms.43 The argument for this move is that
consumers are generally on notice that a given contract includes some kinds
of terms and not others. To this end, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
adopted section 211, affirming the general duty to read, but carving out an
exception when “the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew” of the unread provision
in question.44 The comment to the Restatement explicitly acknowledges the
reality of standardized agreements:
Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the
standard terms. They trust to the good faith of the party using the
form and to the tacit representation that like terms are being
accepted regularly by others similarly situated. But they understand
that they are assenting to the terms not read or not understood,
subject to such limitations as the law may impose.45
The Restatement approach is in accord with the doctrine of “reasonable
expectations,”46 which has also had sporadic influence since Friedrich
Kessler’s 1943 proposal that the terms of form contracts be ignored in favor
of the consumer’s “reasonable expectations.”47 The proposition that courts
should attend to the contract that consumers reasonably believe they are
signing remains viable in a few contracts contexts, insurance most notably.48
In most contracts contexts, courts have rejected the reasonable
expectations doctrine, which means that the primary judicial tool for
scrutiny of unfair terms is the doctrine of unconscionability.49 The
unconscionability inquiry requires both procedural and substantive
unfairness, and the relationship between the two is commonly understood as
a sliding scale, where “the more substantively oppressive the contract term,
42. See Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971) (holding that a hold
harmless clause, hidden and unexplained to the plaintiff, was not enforceable).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
44. Id. § 211(3).
45. Id. § 211 cmt. b.
46. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 967 (1970).
47. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 637 (1943).
48. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to Prevent Deceptive
Contracting by Standard Form, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853, 858–62.
49. See id. at 863.
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the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the
conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”50 Procedural
unconscionability asks whether a consumer has had an opportunity to read
and understand the terms.51 Courts typically require that a party’s duty to
read be met with an opportunity to read.52 In Williams v. Walker-Thomas, for
example, the court ruled that the question of consent must be resolved with
reference to each party’s “reasonable opportunity to understand the terms
of the contract” and considering the “maze of fine print and . . . deceptive
sales practices.”53
In modern academic debates, clearly egregious substantive
unconscionability is easier to define than procedural unconscionability—
when a term is really shocking, it is often barred by statute54 or subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny under the common law of contracts (for
example, exculpatory clauses or penalty clauses). Like other scholars
grappling with the meaning of consent to standard terms, the focus of my
argument is on terms that may raise some fairness concerns in the context of
contracts of adhesion—non-salient fees, arbitration clauses, forum-selection
clauses, and limitations on firm liability—but almost certainly do not raise a
plausible defense of unconscionability. The vast majority of terms that
consumers receive and do not read are nonetheless enforceable. This is the
challenge for legal scholars who want to support the continued vitality of
consent in contract theory but nonetheless acknowledge the day-to-day
reality of modern contracting.
C. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Contracts scholars have not been silent on the question of nonreadership and consent. There are three primary defenses that support
enforcing consent to boilerplate.
The first defense argues that what really matters is reasonable notice
that terms exist, and that the role of the terms themselves is purely formal.
Robert Hillman, writing in support of the American Law Institute’s
disclosure-of-terms strategy for standardized online contracts, argues that
what matters is the “opportunity to read.”55 Hillman asserts that this notion is

50. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
51. See generally 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 28, § 18:10.
52. Sw. Adm’rs, Inc. v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (“‘Fraud in the
execution’ arises when a party executes an agreement ‘with neither knowledge nor reasonable
opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms.’” (quoting U.C.C. § 3305(2)(c))).
53. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
54. See, e.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 675/8.5(e) (LexisNexis 2013) (barring universal
default clauses in contracts for credit).
55. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 105 (2011).
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consistent with justifications of enforcement in other legal domains.56 “A
fundamental tenet of the rule of law is reasonable notice,” he argues.57
“[W]e all know that people rarely read criminal statutes or understand many
of the intricacies of rules governing even those wrongs of which they are
aware, such as murder or theft. The point is that people could gain access to
these materials, which legitimizes the rules as law.”58 On this view,
readership is unnecessary for disclosure to serve its normative function
within the doctrinal structure. As long as disclosure is “inexpensive and, at
worst, harmless,”59 it is a justifiable regulatory approach because it
legitimizes the imputation of consent.
The second defense of enforcing boilerplate contends that consumers
do consent to boilerplate, insofar as they consent to be bound by the terms
of the deal, knowing that they are not aware of what those terms are.
Subjective consent to unread terms is a coherent possibility under a broader
view of consent. Karl Llewellyn has argued for an inference of “blanket
assent” to the non-bargained-for terms.60 Llewellyn argues that consumers
assent “to any not unreasonable or indecent terms . . . which do not alter or
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”61 Similarly, Randy
Barnett’s influential articulation of contractual consent argues that consent
means a manifestation of an intention to be legally bound.62 According to
this view, all that matters is agreeing to the deal, whatever the deal may
hold—much like we think that people ought to be free to assent to take a
risk or to be surprised, they are free to bind themselves to contracts that they
do not read. This view of consent has become increasingly influential and
widely accepted, and, indeed, it is compatible with much of contract
doctrine. For example, a broad view of consent does not require that a
person actually read his or her contract—it requires only that he sign it (or
otherwise objectively manifest assent).63 Barnett and Llewellyn support this
approach, but note that it requires some kind of doctrinal backstop—thus
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 105−06.
59. Id. at 107.
60. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at 370. Wayne Barnes offers a twist on this view, analogizing
contract formation to voting. In Barnes’s view, a contract has known (read) and unknown
(unread) terms. He argues that in the political process, it is not controversial at all to bind
citizens to the decisions of legislators who make choices that were not known or even
foreseeable by voters at the time of election. Like elected officials, firms desire to be re-elected;
like terms of office, contracts are time delimited. Like impeachment, unconscionability
provides relief in the rare instance of truly outrageous behavior. See Wayne Barnes, Consumer
Assent to Standard Form Contracts and the Voting Analogy, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 839, 842–43 (2010).
61. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at 370.
62. Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647,
655 (2012).
63. See, e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.7 (3d ed. 2004)
(describing the doctrine of objective consent in the context of non-readership).
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their visions of broad consent to the unread deal rely in part on a
background requirement of reasonable expectations or at least a robust
doctrine of unconscionability.64
Finally, the third view holds that the absence of meaningful consent is
unproblematic because market forces will prevent unwanted terms. The
economic argument in favor of enforcement is that market forces will do
what individuals would have done, so actual consent is not the problem we
might think it is.65 In a functioning market in which buyers are reading and
comparing terms, sellers who offer worse terms will lose customers to sellers
offering better terms, so sellers will offer efficient terms. Even if only a
fraction of consumers reads and shops for terms, the non-readers may
benefit from the minority of informed consumers, whose choices affect the
firm’s selection of terms.66 In a competitive market, firms will offer terms
that buyers prefer, in the sense that any requirement of more consumerfriendly terms will be costly for firms and, in turn, costly for consumers.
These three arguments are essentially normative justifications for
enforcing unread terms. These arguments assert that what matters is the
notice of terms rather than the readership (opportunity to read), a broad
rather than a narrow consent (blanket assent), and the efficiency of markettested terms rather than the fairness of any particular term or contract
(economic efficiency). In the next Part, I present the existing literature on
the psychology of the fine print—why consumers do not read it, and how
they understand their obligations under it.
II. PSYCHOLOGY OF BOILERPLATE
In this Part, I set up one of my central claims: that most consumers are
deeply ambivalent about consent to form contracts. First, I identify two
arguably dissonant strands of psychological research in this area: the
cognitive psychology literature explaining why most people do not
deliberate carefully over the fine print, and the moral psychology literature
suggesting that most people view their contractual agreements as serious
moral obligations. This Part concludes with the first experimental study of
this Essay, documenting how these conflicting views play out in a simplified
contracts scenario.

64. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 630–31
(2002) (discussing a market-based justification for form contracts); Goldman, supra note 27, at
715–16 (same).
65. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
66. Id. at 637–39.
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A. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IGNORING FINE PRINT
Melvin Aron Eisenberg has argued that concerns about form contracts
“rest ultimately on the limits of cognition.”67 There are two sets of worries
about cognitive limits—one that is easy to deal with and one that is the
subject of this Essay. The easy worry is that some contract terms are hard to
understand because they are so complicated, jargon-filled, illegible, or
otherwise confusing on their face that they are truly difficult for most people
to understand. These are true “readability” problems,68 like the one in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas, where a pro rata term in a layaway agreement was
so opaque that it would be unreasonable to expect parties without advanced
education to understand the financial risk entailed by each new purchase.69
Although these are sometimes hard problems from a policy perspective, they
are not all that complicated conceptually; most information can be conveyed
in plain language and in a readable font.
Instead, the problem for this discussion is terms that are
comprehensible and visible but routinely ignored. As Eisenberg and others
have argued, this problem is conceptually difficult because market forces not
only fail to protect consumers, but actually force firms to exploit their
customers’ limited attentional resources in order to survive.70 Humans have
limited processing capacity and limited attentional resources, and many
legal scholars have argued against regulation-by-disclosure on these
grounds.71 Because most decision-making is affected by “bounded
rationality, optimistic disposition, systematic underestimation of risks, and
undue weight on the present as compared with the future,”72 standard terms
in form contracts are systematically overlooked and underestimated.
Behavioral contracts literature has attempted to address parties’
systematic disregard of standard terms by suggesting that courts distinguish
between salient and non-salient terms73 and give the salience of the terms
legal relevance. Salient terms like price can be left to market discipline,74 but
67. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 240.
68. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 903–04 (2006).
69. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
70. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004)
(“Absent legal intervention, the sophisticated seller will often exploit the consumer’s behavioral
biases. . . . Such biased contracting is not the consequence of imperfect competition. On the
contrary, competitive forces compel sellers to take advantage of consumers’ weaknesses.”).
71. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8.
72. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 241.
73. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1225 (2003) (“[P]roduct attributes that are
evaluated, compared, and implicitly priced as part of the purchase decision [are] ‘salient’
attributes and product attributes that are not evaluated, compared, and priced as part of the
purchase decision [are] ‘non-salient’ attributes.”).
74. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 461, 485 (1974) (arguing that competition is based on price and not other terms).
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courts ought to scrutinize non-salient terms that consumers will ignore.75
When terms require people to take into account low-probability events76 or
calculate the effects of small, disaggregated fees,77 for example, consumers
are less likely to consider the consequences of the terms or factor them into
a cost–benefit analysis of the transaction. Psychological research suggests
that it is not only that terms are difficult or time-consuming to read, but also
that people have limited attentional resources and will overlook non-salient
features of any transaction. The psychological approach to fine print argues
that there are cognitive explanations for why consumers do not deliberate
over fine-print terms, and these cognitive explanations ought to make us
cautious about construing consent to those terms.
B. MORAL OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT
We do, and indeed must, ignore scores of fine-print terms every day.
Nonetheless, a considerable body of evidence shows that most people take
their contractual obligations very seriously. Studies from behavioral decision
research, including experimental contracts research, document a strong
norm of promise keeping—in the contracts context, a norm of
performance. For over 50 years, scholars have been collecting evidence of
an intuitive moral theory of contract that neither existing contract law nor
straightforward economic incentives can easily explain.78 People take
contracts very seriously and regard their promissory obligations as moral
commitments. In questionnaire studies, participants report that breach of
contract is immoral.79 They prefer to avoid breach of contract, even when
breach is more profitable than performance.80 Participants indicate that
breach should be punished with damages above expectation levels, and that
harms resulting from breach of contract should be punished more heavily
than identical harms resulting from negligence in tort.81 And many people
report a preference for specific performance as a default remedy for breach
75. See Korobkin, supra note 73, at 1207.
76. See id. at 1231–32 (arguing that underweighting of small risks and overconfidence may
contribute to the low salience of terms addressing low-probability events).
77. See Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 879, 889–90 (2008) (“Banks that engage in ‘shrouding’ effectively hide the true cost of
contracting. So customers making the initial purchase decision, i.e., opening the checking
account, may not consider shrouded attributes such as maintenance costs and hidden fees for
account-related services.” (footnote omitted)).
78. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 20, at 60 (finding that Wisconsin businessmen believed
that their contract obligations were supported by moral obligations).
79. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of
Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 (2009).
80. But see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 659 (2010) (reporting the results of an experiment in which
participants indicated greater willingness to breach a contract that included a liquidated
damages clause than one that did not).
81. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 79, at 417–20.
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of contract, even when the value of the performance in question is easily
measured in dollars.82
Furthermore, we have some experimental and real-world evidence that
people honor the terms of contracts that appear quite unfair. One of the
recent puzzles for economists is that so many homeowners are currently
underwater (owing more on their mortgages than their homes are worth),
and yet relatively few of these underwater homeowners strategically
default.83 Surveys of homeowners and experimental questionnaire studies
both offer evidence that homeowners do not walk away from their
mortgages because they consider their loan obligations to be morally
binding contracts.84
It may seem intuitive that these strong views of contract morality would
not apply to form contracts, but the evidence on this is quite mixed. Some
studies have identified differences between perceptions of negotiated and
non-negotiated contracts and mounted strong arguments that people
distinguish between them, on moral and practical grounds. The same is true
for known and unknown terms. However, at least one study on the
commonsense moral attitude toward standard-form contracting shows that
when contract terms are clear and unambiguous, questionnaire participants
report that breach of a standard form contract is no less morally problematic
than breach of a negotiated contract.85 Subjects in that study reported that
in the event that a term is clear, enforcement should not depend on the
term’s provenance (negotiation or boilerplate).86 Similarly, Zev Eigen has
found that reminding the subjects of their moral obligation is the most
effective way to secure performance—even for terms embedded in lengthy
boilerplate contracts.87
It should not be surprising that evidence on form contracts is mixed,
because the social norms of contract appear quite ambiguous. On the one
hand, there is a pervasive rhetoric around the idea of “keeping your word.”
On the other hand, most ordinary consumers live in a world in which
contract formation is hasty by design, often completed with the explicit
understanding that it is a meaningless formality.88 What do terms that are
82. Id. at 413–14.
83. See Luigi Guiso et al., Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 2–3, 9–
12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15145, 2009), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w15145.pdf?new_window=1.
84. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic
Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547 (2011).
85. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100
GEO. L.J. 5, 30 (2011).
86. Id. at 27–30.
87. Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent,
Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 88 (2012).
88. Cf. Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L.
REV. 117, 125 (2007) (arguing that sellers take advantage of various psychological phenomena
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available only via a click-through, or as part of a multi-page agreement
presented at checkout while a line of other customers waits, say about the
sanctity of a contract? Most people get mixed messages about how seriously
they are supposed to be taking these contracts. The goal of Study 1, below, is
to start to document how consumers understand these mixed messages.
C. JUDGING CONSUMER CONSENT
The first study tries to address in a systematic way the tension observed
in the existing psychology literature. The study question is how people take
the information about limited capacity for reading terms and use it to
inform their inferences of consumer consent and culpability for
transactional harms. In order to test the role of contracting procedures on
judgments of assent and enforcement, the subjects were randomly assigned
to read about a readable contract (2 pages) and an unreadable contract (15
pages).
1. Study 1: Blame and the Reasonable Consumer
a.

Method

The goal of the first study is to explore attitudes about consumer
consent. Because the studies in this Essay rely on similar methods, I explain
the methodology in detail here and then refer to the methods in a more
shorthand way in subsequent studies. These studies tested a series of
propositions about beliefs and judgments of consumer consent with short
vignette experiments. Generally, this methodology asked subjects to
consider hypothetical contracts scenarios and answer questions to report
their reactions and assessments. In each study, subjects were randomly
assigned to see one of two versions of a scenario, such that a variable of
interest may be tested experimentally. Subjects were drawn from one of two
adult subject pools: Amazon Mechanical Turk89 or a proprietary pool of
online survey-takers who have signed up through the University of

when they present consumers with standard form contracts at the end of the transaction,
increasing “the chances that consumers will not carefully examine the contract they enter”).
89. Amazon Mechanical Turk is an online platform that permits people to sign up as
workers and perform short tasks for small amounts of money. It has been widely used for
surveys and questionnaire experiments. Subjects are recruited via a short online posting
offering between $0.50 and $1.50 to answer questions for research. After the pre-specified
number of subjects have completed the survey, the task link is disabled on Amazon. Growing
evidence supports the use of this sample; indeed, U.S. workers on Mechanical Turk are
arguably closer to the U.S. population as a whole than subjects recruited from traditional
university subject pools. See Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running
Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411 (2010).
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Pennsylvania. The particular subject pool is noted in the Methods section of
each study.90
Study 1 asked how judgments of consumer and firm behavior at the
time of contract formation affect attributions of consent and blame at the
time of enforcement. In order to experimentally manipulate the variable of
interest here (attributes of contract formation), I tested a scenario
describing a hidden fee in a credit card contract, randomly assigning
subjects to read about either a short or a long set of terms:
Kevin has recently purchased a credit card. He shopped around to
find a card that meets his main preferences, including a low
interest rate and high bonus points to build frequent flyer miles.
When his application is approved, he receives the new card in the
mail along with a [2-page] [15-page] contract that goes with such
cards. The contract between a customer and a credit card company
does not begin until the customer calls and activates the card. He
activates the card without reading the contract, and the next
month finds that the terms included information about the $5 fee
charged for paying the bill online. This was how Kevin had planned
to pay his bill. Kevin is unhappy. Please indicate your agreement
with the statements below.
Subjects were then asked to indicate their agreement with a set of
statements, on a 1 to 7 scale where 1 was “strongly disagree,” 4 was “neither
agree nor disagree,” and 7 was “strongly agree.”
(1) Kevin is to blame for this problem.
(2) It is reasonable to expect Kevin to read a [2-page][15-page]
contract.
(3) Companies should explain fees in ways other than the clause in
the form contract.
(4) Kevin consented to this fee.
(5)Hidden fees like this should be banned.

90. In the University of Pennsylvania’s Proprietary Pool, subjects were recruited over a tenyear period, mostly through their own efforts at searching for ways to earn money by
completing questionnaires. Approximately 90% of respondents were U.S. residents (with the
rest mostly from Canada). The panel is roughly representative of the adult U.S. population in
terms of income, age, and education, but not in terms of sex, because (for unknown reasons)
women predominate in this respondent pool. For each study, an email was sent to about 500
members of the panel, saying how much the study paid and where to find it on the World Wide
Web. Each study was a series of separate web pages, programmed in JavaScript. The first page
provided brief instructions. Each of the others presented a case, until the last, which asked for
(optional) comments and sometimes contained additional questions. Each case had a space for
optional comments. Otherwise the subject had to answer all questions to proceed.

E2_WILKINSON-RYAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1764

4/10/2014 11:35 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1745

Each subject saw both versions of the scenario, but the order was
assigned randomly to permit between-subjects analysis of the first question
only. One hundred subjects participated in the study via Amazon
Mechanical Turk. They were paid $0.75 each for participation in a twominute survey. Ages ranged from 18 to 65 with a median age of 29; 60% of
subjects were male.
b.

Results

Figure 1 documents the mean differences for each of the five variables
identified above. Subjects in the Long condition thought that it was
significantly less reasonable to expect the consumer to read the contract
than subjects in the Short condition.91 In other words, the length of the
contract shifted the balance from one side of the scale (reasonable) to the
other (unreasonable).92 In the Long condition, 34% of the subjects thought
that it was reasonable (5 to 7 on the scale) to expect the consumer to read;
in the Short condition, 76% thought reading was a reasonable expectation.
Figure 1. Mean Agreement, on Scale of 1 to 7, with Statements About
Consumer Behavior and Disclosure Policy, in Short and Long Conditions.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Short
Long

None of the other between-subjects differences were statistically
significant. This means that subjects’ judgments of consumer consent and
consumer blame were essentially unaffected by an otherwise highly salient
feature of the contract. Even though subjects reported that it is
unreasonable to expect a consumer to read a 15-page contract, they
91. Between-subjects comparisons are analyzed with a non-parametric test, which does not
assume a normal distribution of responses. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test used here tests the
hypothesis that the median difference between conditions is not zero.
92. The mean in Short condition was 5.18; the mean in Long condition was 3.62
(W=1885.5, p<.0001).
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nonetheless felt that the non-reading consumer was as responsible for his
non-readership as the consumer who had only two pages of terms to wade
through.93 The same was true for judgments of consent; 86% of subjects in
the Short condition and 82% of subjects in the Long condition agreed (5 to
7 on the scale) that Kevin consented to the fee.94
On the other hand, generally subjects were also concerned about the
company’s role in this transaction—and they were concerned even when the
contract was short. They overwhelmingly agreed (by selecting 5 to 7 on the
scale) that the company should find an alternative way to communicate
information about fees (92% agreed in the Short condition; 96% in the
Long condition)95 and even tended to agree that hidden fees like these
should be banned (82% in the Short condition; 88% in the Long
condition).96
These results present a picture of ambivalence about consumer
consent. Respondents clearly believed that using fine print to impose fees on
consumers is inappropriate—subjects overwhelmingly reported that
companies should find other ways to inform consumers about fees and many
subjects thought that hidden fees should be banned altogether. And subjects
were sensitive to the reality of consumer contracting, indicating that it is
somewhat unreasonable to expect a consumer to read 15 pages of
boilerplate. The puzzle, then, is that these beliefs seem entirely
disconnected from subjects’ equally strong feelings that the non-reading
consumer consented to the contract and bears the blame for the resulting
transactional harm.
The question for the remainder of this Essay is how to explain these
findings. I propose that subjects’ coherent normative theories of consent
cannot fully explain these results. These results suggest that when people are
asked to think about contract formation—how the parties draft and manifest
their assent to terms—most people are sensitive to the context and are
generally concerned about boilerplate transacting. But when the question is
about performance and enforcement, judgment becomes much more stark:
The consent was real and the consumer is to blame.
Of course it is possible that consumers take an explicitly strict-liability
view of contracting. Like the law of contracts, subjects may believe that
consumers are to blame for their transactional harms insofar as entering any
transaction entails a certain assumption of risk. In fact, this explanation is
borne out in the within-subjects results to some extent. Within-subjects
comparisons ask to what extent the average subject differentiated among the

93. The mean in
(W=1409, p=.253).
94. The mean in
(W=1246.5, p=.983).
95. The mean in
(W=1116, p=.322).
96. The mean in
(W=1067, p=.154).

Short condition was 5.48; the mean in Long condition was 5.28
Short condition was 5.62; the mean in Long condition was 5.50
Short condition was 6.04; the mean in Long condition was 6.06
Short condition was 5.40; the mean in Long condition was 5.86
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two conditions—because subjects responded to the scenario in both
conditions, it is possible to discern their views of the difference between the
two situations.
Table 1. Within-Subject Differences in Judgments of Long and Short Contracts
Item

Difference Between Long and Short

Blame

-.78***

Reasonableness

-2.31***

Alternative Presentation

.32***

Consent

-.42***

Ban

.40***

***p<.0001
The differences in Table 1 show how differently the average subject felt
about the variables—consent, blame, etc.—given the difference in the
length of the contract. Each subject read the scenario in both versions.
Thus, on the second item subjects were really being asked to think about
how their intuitions about the contract were different when the contract
length was changed. There were significant differences on every variable.
Two findings stand out. The first is that when the subjects’ task was one
of comparison, their blame attributions were more responsive to the
contract length. Nonetheless, even in this within-subjects comparison in
which subjects are aware of the variable being tested, the magnitude of the
difference between scenarios for Blame is much smaller than the difference
between scenarios for Reasonableness. This means that many subjects
explicitly, knowingly reported that they would blame a consumer no less for
having failed to read an admittedly unreasonably long contract.
Of course, judgments of consumer consent are at least in part founded
in explicit moral theories of individual autonomy. However, there are also
implicit psychological processes affecting the differential judgments of
contract formation and judgments of contract enforcement. What I mean by
this is that there is evidence from various domains of psychology, which I will
take up in turn below, that there is something fundamentally different about
the cognitive processes invoked when people are asked to explain harms.
Importantly, analysis of contract enforcement requires such an explanation
of harms. Making attributions of culpability, the underlying judgment task in
constructing the narrative of a harm, raises a distinct set of cognitions and
motivations. Different cues are more or less salient, and there is pressure to
assign blame in a way that does not conflict with an underlying worldview. In
the next Part, I test the hypothesis that some of the change in stance toward
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consent attributions is implicit, that the task of judgment is different when
we are assessing an agreement (contract formation) than a harm
(enforcement).
III. MOTIVATION TO IMPUTE CONSENT
In the face of ambiguous or mixed evidence, our desires often shape
our beliefs.97 Knowledge of a transactional harm makes attributions of
consent more psychologically appealing. Psychologists have observed for
over fifty years that most people, when confronted with information that
someone has suffered a harm, are motivated to assign blame.98 Not only do
they want to assign blame, they want to assign blame in a way that is
psychologically comfortable.99 Study 2 tests the proposition that judgments
of consumer harms involve motivated reasoning.
A. CONTRACTING IN A JUST MARKETPLACE
The study below is patterned on research of a particular manifestation
of motivated reasoning, referred to as the “just world hypothesis”100 or
“system justification theory.”101 These terms describe the idea that people
are uncomfortable with information that threatens to falsify their preferred
hypothesis that the system we live in is reasonable and fair. We prefer to
believe that things happen for a reason, and thus that victims of harms
deserve their fate.102 Legal scholars have observed and discussed this kind of
motivated blaming in other domains. For example, a strong just world belief
makes observers more likely to think that victims of sexual harassment or
sexual assault contributed to their own victimization.103 It increases

97. See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision
Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568 (1992)
(discussing motivated judgment literature and applying it to research illustrating that
individuals evaluate information consistent with their beliefs less critically when reaching a
preferred conclusion).
98. See, e.g., Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”:
Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966) (showing experimentally
that subjects who were unable to prevent a harm were motivated to derogate the victim).
99. Id.
100. See generally Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution
Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030 (1978).
101. See generally John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, A Decade of System
Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25
POL. PSYCHOL. 881 (2004).
102. Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 663, 676 n.50 (1998) (“‘Just world’ theory posits that people have an intense
psychological need to view the world as a fair place because this perception provides a sense of
control over their lives. The ‘just world’ theory predicts that people will blame a rape victim to
maintain the belief that the world is fair, people get what they deserve, and there is a sense of
order over the environment.” (citation omitted)).
103. See Kristen M. Klein et al., Attributions of Blame and Responsibility in Sexual Harassment:
Reexamining a Psychological Model, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 92, 94 (2011).
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attributions of blameworthiness in criminal prosecutions,104 and it may help
explain how jurors determine causation in torts cases.105 I propose that the
just world belief also has bite in the transactional context.
Study 2 predicts that endorsement of strict liability for objective
manifestations of consumer consent, whether in a given case or as a default
stance in contracts more generally, fits nicely into a theory of the world in
which individual agents interact with a fair and orderly marketplace. The
idea that the harm is attributable to the consumer’s consent is
psychologically appealing. In order to find out whether the fact of harm has
an independent effect on attributions of consent, Study 2 asks subjects to
evaluate assent to a form contract in light of various details about the
transaction and the context. Although subjects were asked to assess assent,
half of them had information about a negative outcome of the transaction.
The hypothesis is that subjects who know that the transaction has ended
badly for the consumer will be more likely to believe that the consumer
consented to the contract than subjects who learn about the consent process
but not the outcome.
1. Study 2: Effect of Harm on Attributions of Consent
a.

Method

This study tested the hypothesis that subjects would be more willing to
conclude that a consumer consented to an unread, unfavorable term if they
learned that the term had in fact affected the consumer. Subjects were
randomly assigned to either the Control condition or the Harm condition.
Each subject read two scenarios, one describing a homeowners insurance
policy and the other describing a new car warranty. Subjects in the Harm
condition also read a short description of the term’s negative effect on the
consumer. In order to minimize the possibility that subjects would be more
likely to attribute consent to unfavorable terms to consumers engaging in
risky behavior, the consumer’s behavior is described as being relatively
routine, even cautious, and the property damage results from the negligent
or intentional act of a third party. The scenarios read as follows:
Insurance Policy:
George is a single 32 year-old restaurant manager. He lives in a
small Midwestern city with his two dogs. George purchased a
homeowners insurance policy when he recently bought a
condominium in a renovated factory downtown. To get insurance,
George met with an insurance agent who gave him the rates for
different levels of coverage, promising to send the complete list of
terms once the deal was done. George chose a mid-level plan
104. Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology
of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1428 (2003).
105. Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345, 1369–71
(2008).
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(neither the cheapest nor the most expensive). He signed up for a
payment plan and signed the policy contract. A week later, he
received a “welcome packet” from his insurance company,
including a ten-page document specifying the details of the policy.
George did not read the policy details, but kept a copy for his files.
Policyholders are permitted to cancel coverage or switch plans at
any time.
One of the terms of George’s policy, explained under the heading
“Personal Valuables,” is that the insurance company will not cover
personal items valued at over $5000 unless the homeowner has
already notified the insurance company that such items are in the
home prior to the damage or loss. George has a small collection of
valuable baseball cards, four of which are valued at over $10,000
each. He plans to sell the cards within the year.
Harm Condition:
George stores his baseball cards in a cabinet in his home office in
his condominium. One morning, a plumbing problem in his
upstairs neighbor’s bathroom causes a big leak in George’s condo,
right into his home office. Water drips into the cabinet and the
baseball cards are ruined.
New Car Warranty:
Jill is a 40 year-old high school teacher who lives in a suburban
California neighborhood with her husband and young daughter.
Jill has recently bought a new car. She shopped around and found
a well-reviewed car with a good warranty. It came with a twenty-page
Detailed Warranty in addition to the basic warranty information
provided at sale (50,000 miles or five years, some restrictions apply,
see Detailed Warranty for details). Jill did not read the Detailed
Warranty, provided in the glove compartment of her new vehicle.
One thing that is not covered is external damage related to
“vandalism, theft, or other criminal activity.” Jill does not live in a
dangerous area, but there are reports of petty theft and property
damage here and there in the local newspaper.
Harm Condition:
Jill parks her car in the parking lot of a nearby supermarket. When
she returns, she finds that her car has been “keyed”—that is,
someone has used their keys and made a long scratch in the paint
on the driver’s side doors.
Subjects either read both scenarios in the control condition (no harm)
or both scenarios in the harm condition. They were then asked to what
extent they agreed with four statements, on a seven-point scale from “Totally
Disagree” at the low end, “Neither Agree nor Disagree” at the midpoint, and
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“Totally Agree” at the high end. The key question was presented first, and it
asked: “Think back to Jill’s warranty. To what extent do you agree that Jill
has consented to the vandalism term?” Subjects were also asked to assess the
consumer’s responsibility, caution, and likability.
In this study, 149 Amazon Mechanical Turk subjects were paid $1.50
each to participate in a five-minute survey online. Ages ranged from 20 to 69
with a median of 37, and 56.4% of the respondents were women.
b.

Results

This comparison had one main effect: Subjects were more likely to
agree that the promisee had consented to the unfavorable term when they
had information that the term affected the promisee.106 Means are shown in
Table 2. In general, the trends for the Responsible, Cautious, and Likable
variables were in the predicted direction (less favorable when the party
suffers a harm), but none were statistically significant. In other words, a
party who has suffered a harm is perceived as more likely to have consented
to that harm than a party who has made similar representations of consent
but has not been harmed. Or, put differently, subjects were ambivalent
about the meaning of consent to the unread term until they received
information that motivated a decision to attribute consent.
Table 2. Mean Agreement that the Party in Question “Consented to” the
Unfavorable Term.
Control

Harm

Insurance Scenario

4.80

5.20

Warranty Scenario

4.66

5.55

In this study, the mere fact of a transactional harm changes how
individuals think about consent. One can imagine an explicit theory (as
opposed to psychologically motivated reasoning) that justifies the
disjunction between reasonable expectations of readership and consumer
blame in Study 1—it might be that we know consumer contracting is
burdensome but believe that consumers should be held to a high standard
whenever they voluntarily enter the marketplace. Study 2 does not lend itself
to this kind of explicit explanation. Subjects were asked to indicate the
nature of the consumer’s gamble in consent terms; the only difference
between the consumer in the Control and Harm conditions is that in the

106. For the Insurance scenario, the difference in Consent values across conditions is
marginally significant in a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test (W=2276, p=.053). For the
Warranty scenario, the difference is highly significant using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(W=1871, p=.0005).
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Harm case, the consumer has lost his bet. Normatively, knowledge of the
outcome should not affect the assessment of the decision.
If the just world hypothesis makes people more likely to attribute
culpability or complicity to the victims of random violent attacks, it should
not be surprising that it has purchase in the contracts context. In contract, a
consumer knowingly consents to be bound to the contents of the contract;
the cognitive leap is barely noticeable—and indeed easily defensible. Adam
Benforado has explicitly drawn the connection between the just world belief
and the derogation of financially struggling consumers, arguing that the
tendency to blame the victim explains much of the popular rhetoric blaming
underwater homeowners or borrowers in bankruptcy for their fates.107 If
feckless consumers are making poor choices, transactional harms are
consistent with the belief that the marketplace is a reasonable, fair place
where consumers have control over their deals—and, indeed, this approach
is probably best for the individual consumer. Consumers should be cautious,
should seek to understand their high-stakes agreements, and should assume
that the choices they make matter. The question is whether and how this
prudential stance ought to affect our judgments of blameworthiness.
The results of Study 2 suggest that when asked to judge a transactional
harm, inferences of consumer consent may result from a form of motivated
reasoning. That is, people prefer to make the judgment, “It’s your fault.”
Notwithstanding this preference, it seems plausible that this judgment could
be quite uncomfortable. On the one hand, no one wants to think that the
system is rigged. Yet, on the other hand, most people are ordinary
consumers, so blaming consumers for transactional harms places the blame
on people very much like oneself. In the next experiment, I test the
proposition that a very well-known psychological bias, the overconfidence
effect, gives people a way to distance themselves from consumers affected by
a transactional harm: “It’s your fault—and I’m not like you.”
B. OVERCONFIDENCE
There is reason to think that individuals may overestimate their own
skill and caution in consumer transactions, thus making it easier to blame
others who do not read their contracts carefully. Broadly speaking, most
people are motivated to form positive assessments of their own attributes,
including their own luck. For example, 88% of the general American
population rates their own driving as safer than the median driver;108 twothirds of college professors believe that their teaching is in the top

107. Adam Benforado, Don’t Blame Us: How Our Attributional Proclivities Influence the
Relationship Between Americans, Business and Government, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 509, 540–
41 (2010).
108. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981).
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quartile;109 and roughly 85% of a random sample of residents of New Jersey
thought that they had “below-average” risk of getting food poisoning.110
Study 3 predicts that this kind of overconfidence applies to one’s
consumer activities; many people agree that fine print is problematic but
overestimate their own skill and caution in the marketplace.
1. Study 3: Overestimating One’s Own Readership
This study tests the hypothesis that even though many people believe
that others are inattentive to their respective contracts, people believe that
their own likelihood to read contracts is much higher.
a.

Method

This questionnaire study was conducted with 120 subjects from the
proprietary University of Pennsylvania subject pool described in Part II.111
Subjects read short vignettes about contracts and then answered questions
about them. The study used three core vignettes, each presented in two
conditions. The vignettes described, respectively, a contract for a new credit
card, a contract for a home computer, and a car warranty. The two
conditions were Self and Other. Subjects were asked to answer how much of
the contract that they would likely read, and how much of the contract that
the average person would likely read.
The three scenarios in the Self condition are as follows. The Other
condition is identical except that it asks subjects to think about “consumers”
generally.112
Credit Card Contract:
Please imagine that you are applying for a new credit card. You
shop around to find a card that meets your main preferences (low
interest rate, good bonus features, easy to pay bill and redeem
points, etc.). Your application for the card is approved, and you
receive the new card in the mail along with the three-page contract.
The contract between you and the credit card company does not
begin until you call and activate the card.

109.

K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, but Will College Teaching Be Improved?, 17 NEW DIRECTIONS
Spring 1977, at 10.
110. Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE 1232, 1232 (1989).
111. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
112. The Other condition of this scenario, for example, read, “Imagine consumers who are
applying for new credit cards. They shop around to find a card that meets their main
preferences (low interest rate, good bonus features, easy to pay bill and redeem points, etc.).
When their applications are approved, they receive the new cards in the mail along with the
three page contracts that go with such cards. The contract between a customer and a credit
card company does not begin until the customer calls and activates the card.”
FOR HIGHER EDUC.,
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Computer Purchase:
Please imagine that you are purchasing a home desktop computer.
It costs about $1500. It comes with a set of detailed contract terms,
approximately six pages. You do not need to sign them, but if you
do not return the computer within five days of purchase, it is
understood that you have agreed to the terms and conditions that
came in the contract that was in the box.
Car Warranty:
Please imagine that you are purchasing a new car from a
dealership. When you buy the car you must deal with the financing,
the sales agreement, and the warranty. The warranty is their New
Vehicle Warranty, and it is contained in a short Warranty
Information Booklet (a five-inch booklet of about 20 pages). The
booklet’s first page gives a summary of its contents.
After each vignette, subjects were asked to estimate both the number of
minutes that they (or the average consumer) would spend reading the
contract, as well as the percentage of the text that they would read, “either
carefully or skimming attentively enough to get the gist.” Subjects were
randomly assigned to complete either all of the Self or all of the Other items
first, and then all subjects saw the items in the other condition, permitting
both between- and within-subjects analyses. Order of items within blocks was
randomized.
b.

Results

Subjects reported that they would spend more time, and read enough
to “get the gist” of a greater fraction of the contract, than the average
consumer reading the same contract.113 Means are reported in Table 3.

113. The between-subject’s Self and Other difference was significant for minutes spent
reading the credit card contract (t=3.18, df=115.86, p=.004) and estimated percent of credit
card contract covered (t=5.92, df=115.12, p=.000). The Self and Other difference was
significantly different for estimated minutes spent reading the computer contract (t=2.95,
df=105.56, p=.004) and the estimated percent of computer contract read (t=4.54, df=115.68,
p=.000). The difference was not significant for minutes spent reading the car warranty
(p=.205), but it was marginally significant for fraction of warranty read (t=1.92, df=118.5,
p=.057). The subject’s sex did not affect overall differences. Overall, women predicted more
time reading contracts than men, except in the Car Warranty example.
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Table 3. Estimated Time Spent Reading Contracts, and Fraction of
Contracts Read, for Self and for Average Consumer.
Self

Average Consumer

Credit Card: Minutes

10.6

6.1

Credit Card: Fraction

65.3%

33.0%

Computer: Minutes

12.4

6.8

Computer: Fraction

56.5%

31.4%

Car Warranty: Minutes

14.2

11.6

Car Warranty: Fraction

54.5%

43.8%

In addition to the between-subjects differences reported in the table
above, there is also a strong within-subjects effect, meaning that a given
subject reported higher minutes and percentages for Self than for Average
Consumer.114
This kind of motivated reasoning facilitates attributions of consent
when other consumers are harmed, both by supporting the notion that fine
print is readable (“I would have read it”) and by distancing one’s self from
the consumervictims. Subjects may believe that they are generally more
cautious than others and/or that their own disclosure triage process
prioritizes high-stakes contracts more effectively than others’ processes. In
either case these are self-serving beliefs. Here, these self-serving beliefs are
part of the consent attribution psychology. People who believe in their own
careful reading of boilerplate can feel comfortable blaming others for failing
to do so.
In this Part, I have tried to make the case that judgments of
transactional harms are disconnected from judgments of contract
formation, in part due to the motivations associated with how we judge
harms that happen to other people. In the next Part, I consider how
cognitive heuristics—rules of thumb that individuals use when they do not
have information about the distribution of outcomes—especially heuristics
based on salience, might affect judgments of transactional harms.

114. Subjects thought that they would spend 2.0 minutes more than the average consumer
reading the credit card contract (t=2.80, df=121, p=.006), 4.7 more minutes reading the
computer terms (t=3.70, df=120, p=.000), and 3.7 more minutes reading the car warranty
(t=3.94, df=120, p=.000). Similarly, they thought that they would read 23.7% more of the credit
card contract than the average consumer (t=8.05, df=121, p=.000), 21.5% more of the
computer contract (t=7.11, df=121, p=.000), and 15.1% more of the car warranty (t=5.12,
df=121, p=.000).
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IV. AVAILABILITY AND SALIENCE IN CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION
Substantial evidence indicates a shared preference for holding people
to their contracts, however egregious the terms.115 In this Part, I argue that
there are psychological processes that contribute to the arguably outsized
role of any fact of consent in attributions of culpability for transactional
harms.
A. COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING
Making a causal attribution is a psychologically demanding judgment
task. The psychological study of causation reveals the heavy role of salience
and availability for these kinds of judgments. For example, the first and last
event in a chain of causality will receive more attention than those in the
middle.116 Unlikable people are perceived as playing a greater causal role in
harmful events than others, even when there is no other evidence of
differential culpability.117 And events that are under personal control tend to
be more salient than those that are not.118 Research in this area has found
that people rely heavily on counterfactual reasoning when they are judging
harms: “[F]or negative outcomes, counterfactuals are after-the-fact
realizations of ways that would have been sufficient to prevent the
outcomes—and especially ways that actors themselves could have prevented
their misfortunes.”119
Imagine that we are considering the plight of an underwater
homeowner facing a sudden increase in the payments on her adjustable-rate
mortgage loan. Further imagine that this homeowner might have qualified
for a traditional fixed-rate mortgage, avoiding this problem altogether. One
natural explanation for the homeowner’s situation is that she failed to avoid
a very avoidable problem. This theory of social judgment predicts that each
actual experience evokes “counterfactual alternatives,” and that we
understand experiences in reference to their un-realized alternatives.120 This

115. See, e.g., Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69
MICH. L. REV. 247, 27274 (1970) (conducting a study that documented that many participants
assumed terms in standard-form leases were enforceable when in fact courts had held the terms
violated public policy).
116. See Barbara A. Spellman, Crediting Causality, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 323,
324–26 (1997) (describing the hypothesis that people assign more causal effect to events that
happen first and last in the causal chain).
117. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL.
556, 556 (2000) (finding that “evidence concerning the event is reviewed in a manner that
favors ascribing blame to the person or persons who evoke the most negative affect or whose
behavior confirms unfavorable expectations”).
118. Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 133, 139 (1997).
119. Barbara A. Spellman & David R. Mandel, When Possibility Informs Reality: Counterfactual
Thinking as a Cue to Causality, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 120, 122 (1999).
120. Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93
PSYCHOL. REV. 136 (1986). The following is a classic example of counterfactual alternatives:
Imagine two people rushing to the airport, both of whom get stuck in traffic and arrive 30
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research predicts that bad outcomes feel more regrettable as it becomes
easier to imagine how they could have been avoided. The salience of
different counterfactuals depends on many factors, but some
counterfactuals are consistently more salient than others.
Reliance on counterfactuals (sometimes referred to as “norm theory”)
is an availability heuristic.121 When an event or an attribute is particularly
salient, it is very easy to call to mind (or very cognitively “available”).
Furthermore, studies have shown that blame—whether directed at the self
or others—depends on the salience of the counterfactual.122
Consumer consent is a causal link that is easy to call to mind. In a
variety of studies, subjects assigned greater blame to those persons whose
choices were easier to mentally unwind—that is, the easier it is to imagine
how someone might have avoided a harm, the easier it is to find them
responsible for that harm. This has particular purchase in the disclosure
setting for a number of reasons. Research suggests that the more available
counterfactual is the one that changes the more obviously controllable and
mutable elements of the situation—for example, the individual actor’s
choices rather than the background decisions of a large firm.123 Second,
more recent occurrences in a series of events evoke counterfactual
alternatives more strongly and are more likely to be blamed for negative
outcomes.124 In the world of contract, drafting comes first, and consent later.
The hypothesis of Study 4 is that when a consumer experiences a
transactional harm, the consumer’s consent is a very salient link in the chain
of causation. Whereas the firm’s actions may be diffused and hard to piece
together, the consumer’s agreement is a single moment, memorialized,
easily attributable to a single actor. For most individuals, imagining what a
consumer could do differently is much easier than imagining what a
company drafting a contract could do differently—we have lots of
experience with the former and next to none with the latter.
In the study reported below, the goal was to manipulate the salience of
the counterfactual, such that either the consumer’s decision to consent or
the firm’s decision to include the term was more salient. One method of
testing norm theory predictions is to change the foreground and
background actors. A common finding in the counterfactual reasoning
literature is that the salient counterfactual is typically the one that changes

minutes after the flight is scheduled to leave. One is told that his flight left on time, and the
other that her flight left 25 minutes late, only five minutes before. Almost everyone thinks that
the person who missed the flight by five minutes is more upset.
121. Id.
122. In a study of accident victims, for example, victims’ self-blame was predicted by the
degree to which they believed they could have avoided the accident, even holding causal
attributions constant. Christopher G. Davis et al., Self-Blame Following a Traumatic Event: The Role
of Perceived Avoidability, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 557, 56265 (1996).
123. Roese, supra note 118, at 139.
124. Dale T. Miller & Saku Gunasegaram, Temporal Order and the Perceived Mutability of
Events: Implications for Blame Assignment, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1111, 1111 (1990).
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the behavior of the “protagonist” or the foreground actor.125 In order to test
the role of counterfactual thinking, subjects in this study were randomly
assigned to read about a firm’s drafting decision as a background state or as
a recent decision. A decision is easier to mentally unwind than a background
state, so this study’s hypothesis is that culpability attributions would shift
toward the firm in the decision condition.
1. Study 4: Making Firm Behavior More Salient
I predicted that the natural reading of consumer contracts scenarios is
that firm behavior is taken as a given, as background, whereas the consumer
decisions are easy to mentally unwind. However, it is possible to make firm
choice more salient by highlighting the possibility that firm behavior is not
immutable by couching the firm’s inclusion of the unfavorable term in
active language.
a.

Method

Respondents to this scenario were drawn from two online pools of adult
subjects.126 Their responses are collapsed for this analysis.
Subjects were asked to read the following scenario and answer follow-up
questions. Subjects in the control group read:
Ben purchases an item from an online retailer he has never used
before. Soon afterward, he starts receiving two to four letters a day
from mortgage and credit card lenders, offering to open new lines
of credit for him. He is annoyed, and looks to figure out how his
name got on these mailing lists. He soon finds that it was the online
purchase he made. The company’s default policy is to share
customer addresses with “affiliated businesses.” Details of the
privacy policy were described on a pop-up screen accessible by a
link next to the “I agree to Terms and Conditions” button. Ben
clicked the “Agree” button without clicking through to the privacy
policy page. Indicate your agreement with the statements below.
Subjects in the Active Firm (norm) group read the same scenario,
except the sentence about the company’s default policy was changed to
read, “The company recently changed its default privacy policy and it now
shares customer addresses with ‘affiliated businesses.’”

125. Ruth M.J. Byrne & Vittorio Girotto, Cognitive Processes in Counterfactual Thinking, in
HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 151, 151–52 (Keith D. Markman et al.
eds., 2009).
126. One hundred and ten subjects from the Penn proprietary subject pool were paid
$1.50 to complete a five-minute survey. One hundred and two subjects participated via Amazon
Mechanical Turk. They were paid $1 for participating in the five-minute study. There were no
significant differences in patterns of responses by subject pool, so their data were collapsed for
analysis.
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Each subject was asked to indicate the extent to which the consumer
was to blame for the disclosure of his address, and the extent to which the
company was to blame.
b.

Results

In general, most subjects thought that both the consumer and the
company were to blame. Responding on a seven-point scale, those in the
control group assigned average blame to the company at 4.33, and to the
consumer at 4.83; those in the norm group assessed the company’s blame at
4.91 and the consumer’s blame at 4.61.
There were no effects of condition on assessments of consumer blame
or firm blame. However, the important question here is arguably how
subjects apportioned blame between consumer and firm. Accordingly, in
order to test the effect of the scenario, I compared—across conditions—the
average subject’s differential assignment of blame to consumer and firm.
There was a significant difference—making the firm’s behavior more salient
changed how subjects ranked the blameworthiness of the parties.
Specifically, the average subject in the control group thought that the
consumer was about a half-point (.49 on a seven-point scale) more
blameworthy than the firm; the average subject in the norm group thought
that the firm was slightly (.3 points) more culpable than the consumer.127
To the extent that narratives of transactional harm focus on the choices
of the consumer (e.g., should the consumer have signed the contract or
not), the framing of the problem tends to make the consumer’s choice set
highly salient and the firm’s role apparently a fait accompli. Unless
participants are prompted to think about the firm’s drafting process as a set
of choices, the drafter’s role is not a salient factor in judgments of blame.
Inquiries into consumer consent are about the consumer’s decisions
against a set of background facts, including the contracts of adhesion that
consumers encounter. In the last study of this Essay, I turn to one additional
background reality of consumer decision-making that is often overlooked in
judgments of consent and transactional harms: reading terms in a context of
disclosure overload.
B. INATTENTION TO OVERLOAD: ITEM BRACKETING
One of the challenges of thinking about disclosure policies is that
individual policies are considered separately, and each one sounds like a
plausible solution for informing consumers. In the aggregate, though, the
myriad disclosures become overwhelming. This is precisely the kind of
situation in which behavioral researchers have observed the effects of
“choice bracketing.”128 Choice bracketing research shows that people make
different decisions when choices are presented in a broad bracket—all
decisions made together—than they do when the decisions are made in a

127.
128.

W=6045.5, p=.043.
Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171, 171–72 (1999).
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narrow bracket—decisions made serially.129 Broad bracketing often leads to
higher-utility choices because it permits people to consider the
interdependent consequences of a particular plan or action.130 Study 5 tests
the proposition that failure to read standard terms is deemed less
blameworthy when subjects are reminded of the disclosure-full marketplace.
1. Study 5: Salience of Disclosure Overload
This study tests the hypothesis that disclosure overload is not a naturally
salient feature of the consent judgment, but that subjects will be less likely to
blame non-reading consumers for transactional harms when the study
scenario makes the context of disclosure overload more salient.
a.

Method

The hypothesis of the study was that support for disclosure regimes
would weaken when subjects were prompted to think about the number of
disclosures that an average American citizen encounters each day. Subjects
were randomly assigned to a Control condition or a Prompt condition.
Subjects in the Prompt condition saw the following item before moving to
the policy questions:
Disclosures can include everything from information about
changes in your insurance policy to a list of a drug’s side effects you
see in an ad for prescription medication to the FBI warning at the
beginning of a DVD movie you’ve bought. Please estimate the
number of disclosure statements that the average person
encounters in a single day.
Participants were then asked to consider three situations in which
consumers were surprised by an adverse term in a warranty or disclosure.
They read as follows:
Privacy Policy:
Ben purchases an item from an online retailer. Soon afterward, he
starts receiving two to four letters a day from mortgage and credit
card lenders, offering to open new lines of credit for him. He is
annoyed, and looks to figure out how his name got on these
mailing lists. He soon finds that it was the online purchase he
made, which had a privacy policy next to it informing him that they
would share his name and address with “affiliates.” He had not read
the policy, which was provided in a box on the retailer’s checkout
page.

129.
130.

Id. at 172–73.
Id.
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Car Warranty:
Greg has recently bought a new car. It comes with a 20-page
Detailed Warranty in addition to the basic warranty information
provided at sale (50,000 miles or five years, some restrictions apply,
see Detailed Warranty for details). Six months after purchase,
Greg’s car is briefly submerged in water after a flash flood makes a
small pond in his driveway, a highly unusual occurrence in his area.
He brings it to the dealer and finds out that flood damage is not
covered. If his car had been parked in the garage, it would not have
been affected by the flooding. He had not read the warranty closely
enough to see the flood provision, which was provided on page 13.
Credit Card Penalty:
Jill has a credit card with National Bank. She receives a bill from
them in the mail every month. Three months ago, her bill included
an additional flyer, a one-page document with normal type. At the
top in red letters it said: “Important: New Information About the
Terms of Your Credit Card Contract.” Among other things, it
informed customers that the previous policy of interest rate
increases after three late payments would be amended to permit
interest rate increases after only two late payments. Jill did not read
the flyer. While moving from one apartment to another, Jill’s bill
paying systems get disorganized. She pays her credit card bill late
two months in a row, paying a small late fee each time. When she
goes to pay her bill the next month (on time) she sees that her
interest rate has dramatically increased. She calls the credit card
company and they point her to the flyer that she did not read.
After each scenario, subjects were asked to indicate their agreement with
three statements. The first statement was about the extent to which it is the
consumer’s responsibility to read the disclosure carefully. The second asked
to what extent this kind of disclosure was a good policy.131 The third asked
whether the subjects believed that they would have read the disclosure.

131. The privacy policy question statement read: “Requiring the company to disclose the
ways they share information with other companies is a good way to address customer privacy
concerns.” Car Warranty: “Requiring the company to disclose the flood restriction in the
warranty is a good way to help consumers compare the sales terms in order to choose the best
deal on a new car.” Credit Card Penalty: “Requiring the credit card company to send a flyer to
alert customers to new terms is a good way to prevent the credit card companies from taking
advantage of borrowers.”
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Results

The median estimate for the number of disclosures a consumer sees in
a day was ten; the mean was fifteen.132
Using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, I compared how responses to
each question differed by condition.133 Mean differences are reported in
Table 4. The prompt had consistent effects on the participants’
endorsement of the idea that reading the contracts in question was the
consumer’s responsibility, on the support for the disclosure policy, and on
participants’ beliefs that, had they been in the consumer’s position, they
would have read the disclosure or contract.
Table 4. Mean Differences, Control Minus Prompt
Consumer’s
Responsibility

Disclosure Is
Good Policy

I Would Have
Read It

Privacy Policy

.33

.30

.69

Car Warranty

.21

.37

.34

Credit Card
Penalty

.20

.33

.43

The study showed that subjects were less likely to endorse strict
adherence to constructive consent doctrines in contract when they were
prompted to think about disclosure overload.
In sum, this Part presents evidence that consumer choice is a very
salient feature of how we understand transactional harm. Many people
would agree that as drafters, firms have control over form contracts that
individuals do not. And they would also agree that a reasonable person who
wants to participate in the consumer marketplace must sign many contracts
without reading the terms. These considerations are arguably central
features of any judgment of consumer consent, but in an assessment of
harm, they are much less cognitively available than the consumer’s behavior.

132. One hundred and twenty-three subjects participated in an online survey via Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Subjects were paid $1.50 each to participate in a 15-minute survey. Subjects
were all recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Ages ranged from 19 to 69 with a median
age of 35, and 56.1% of subjects were female.
133. Privacy Policy: Responsibility (W=1516, p=.033); Policy (W=1389.5, p=.004); Would
Read (W=1436, p=.014). Car Warranty: Responsibility (W=1589, p=.073); Policy (W=1411.5,
p=.007); Would Read (W=1693, p=.244).
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V. TOWARD A PROCEDURAL JUSTICE OF CONTRACTS
Together, these studies sketch a picture of the moral psychology of
consent to fine print. Many subjects reported misgivings about the policy of
disclosing important terms via fine print, and many expressed uncertainty
that consent to unread fine print was meaningful consent. The existence of
disclosures in assessments of consent ex post, though, was dispositive. Unless
prompted to consider alternate explanations for transactional harms—firm
wrongdoing or disclosure overload—subjects in these studies understood
transactional harms as products of consumer consent.
This juxtaposition raises the possibility of a “procedural justice” of
contracts. In psychology, procedural justice research describes the role of
process in judgments of fairness. People are more willing to accept
disadvantageously inequitable outcomes when they perceive that there was a
fair process for determining who got what—even if there is clear evidence
that the elements of procedural “fairness” were essentially meaningless.134 A
classic example is as follows.135 Participants in a laboratory experiment were
each to be assigned a certain number of tasks, such that some participants
would bear a heavier burden than others. They were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions, voice or no voice. In the voice condition, subjects
could express an opinion about the number of tasks they had been assigned.
In the no voice condition, they were not invited to do so. The opinions
expressed by those in the voice condition had no bearing on the number of
tasks they were assigned, and this was transparent to the subjects themselves.
Nonetheless, those who had a “voice” judged the assignment procedure to
be fairer and judged their own number of assigned tasks to be more
acceptable. In other words, the pretense of a fair process was enough to
quell objections to arbitrary outcomes.
The results I have presented here are troubling for that reason; they
suggest that the presence of disclosures may have implicit effects on
attributions of consent and blame that most consumers and most
policymakers would not anticipate. Thus, we might be ambivalent about
whether a consumer has really consented to some hidden term. Given our
ambivalence, we might assume that doubts about the consent will factor into
decisions about enforcement. When it is time to ask questions about
enforcement, though, the fact of the disclosure is dispositive. Some
commentators have argued that even though it is true that disclosures are
probably ineffective, they “can’t hurt.”136 My contention is that this kind of
attitude leads to overuse of disclosures that do not affect consumer decision-

134. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control, and
Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 95556 (1990).
135. See generally id. at 954–55 (describing a study in which some participants were given a
voice and others were not, finding that participants that were given a voice were happier with
the outcome).
136. See Hillman, supra note 18, at 295–300.
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making, but have implicit effects on the moral calculus of transactional
harms.
In the tort and criminal law contexts, psychologists have identified a
similar problem with respect to the fair process effect. Someone who is
thinking about what constitutes a fair process would not conclude that the
ability to contribute feedback into a never-opened suggestion box is the
same as having a meaningful voice in the process.137 Nonetheless, the ability
to put comments in that box affects how people view the fairness of the
resulting outcome. Similarly, in contract, most people are troubled by the
unrealistic demands on consumers to consent to terms that they cannot
read. Nonetheless, the mere fact of the signature or the “I Agree” click has a
profound effect on how they view the outcomes of that transaction.
The fair process effect may be something of a heuristic.138 It is probably
sensible in many applications, but it raises thorny questions for the
normative standing of consent. As psychologist Robert MacCoun says: “In
the procedural justice domain, the concern is that authorities can use the
appearance of fair procedure (dignity, respect, voice) as an inexpensive way
to coopt citizens and distract them from outcomes that by normative criteria
might be considered substantively unfair or biased.”139 On the other hand:
“[T]here is also discomfort with the implicit notion that we scholars can
assert that ordinary people are mistaken in their understanding of their
social world—a notion that seems politically elitist and epistemologically
naive.”140 In the context of contract, the concern is that sophisticated parties
(e.g., corporations and other repeat players) use consumer consent in a
distorted way—presenting disclosures or terms that consumers will not read,
but will nonetheless insulate the firm from both legal liability and consumer
backlash.
The literature on procedural justice has largely overlooked (with the
notable exception of Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff’s studies of just
negotiation141) the possibility of a troubling fair process effect in
transactional contexts. The evidence from this Essay suggests that at least
some attributions of consent to unfavorable terms outweigh thin, formalistic
assent procedures that most observers would find problematic if assessing

137. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims
and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 238–39
n.118 (2012) (reviewing literature suggesting that even non-meaningful participation leads
people to view a process as more fair).
138. As noted above, a heuristic is a rule of thumb that individuals use when they do not
have information about the distribution of outcomes.
139. Robert MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural
Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 189 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1693356.
140. Id.
141. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381 (2010);
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness,
Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 473 (2008).
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them in the context of contract formation. My hope is that this project is the
first in a larger research agenda around transactional procedural justice.
CONCLUSION
The problem that I have raised in this Essay has vexed legal scholars for
decades: How seriously should contract law take consent in a world in which
consumers must consent lightly to most of their contractual obligations? The
common wisdom is that the approach that we have isn’t working. Yet,
regulating contracts by mandating disclosure serves a normative function,
even as we acknowledge that it fails its ostensible communicative function.
Indeed, this view is reasonable enough as long as the limits of the legal
fiction are equally salient ex post as they are ex ante.
The experiments I have presented here raise the possibility that
although people agree that disclosures do not have noticeable effects on the
assent process, they have enormous effects on how we understand
transactional harms. That is, the grain of salt with which people take consent
to standard terms is nowhere to be found when the question is whether a
consumer is to blame for having agreed to an unfavorable term. Any
objective manifestation of assent is highly salient in the attribution of
culpability for transactional harms, obscuring procedural defects that people
are otherwise quick to identify. The next steps in the study of the moral
psychology of contract must take on the possibility that consumer consent,
and attributions of consumer consent, are more complex than we have
allowed.

